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Georg Kreisel (15 September 1923 – 1 March 2015) was a formidable math-
ematical logician during a formative period when the subject was becoming
a sophisticated field at the crossing of mathematics and logic. Both with his
technical sophistication for his time and his dialectical engagement with man-
dates, aspirations and goals, he inspired wide-ranging investigation in the meta-
mathematics of constructivity, proof theory and generalized recursion theory.
Kreisel’s mathematics and interactions with colleagues and students have been
memorably described in Kreiseliana ([Odifreddi, 1996]). At a different level of
interpersonal conceptual interaction, Kreisel during his life time had extended
engagement with two celebrated logicians, the mathematical Kurt Go¨del and
the philosophical Ludwig Wittgenstein. About Go¨del, with modern mathemat-
ical logic palpably emanating from his work, Kreisel has reflected and written
over a wide mathematical landscape. About Wittgenstein on the other hand,
with an early personal connection established Kreisel would return as if with
an anxiety of influence to their ways of thinking about logic and mathematics,
ever in a sort of dialectic interplay. In what follows we draw this out through
his published essays—and one letter—both to elicit aspects of influence in his
own terms and to set out a picture of Kreisel’s evolving thinking about logic
and mathematics in comparative relief.1
As a conceit, we divide Kreisel’s engagements with Wittgenstein into the
“early”, “middle”, and “later” Kreisel, and account for each in successive sec-
tions. §1 has the “early” Kreisel directly interacting with Wittgenstein in the
1940s and initial work on constructive content of proofs. §2 has the “middle”
Kreisel reviewing Wittgenstein’s writings appearing in the 1950s. And §3 has
the “later” Kreisel, returning in the 1970s and 1980s to Wittgenstein again, in
the fullness of time and logical experience.
Throughout, we detected—or conceptualized—subtle forth-and-back phe-
nomena, for which we adapt the Greek term “chiasmus”, a figure of speech for a
reverse return, as in the trivial “never let a kiss fool you or a fool kiss you”.2 The
meaning of this term will accrue to new depth through its use in this account
to refer to broader and broader reversals.
1Most of the essays appear, varyingly updated and in translation, in the helpful collection
[Kreisel, 1990a]. Our quotations, when in translation, draw on this collection.
2I owe the use of this term to my colleague Jeffrey Mehlman’s in his remarkable [2010, §7].
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1 Early Kreisel
At the intersection of generations, Kreisel as a young man had direct interac-
tions with Wittgenstein in his last decade of life. Kreisel matriculated at Trinity
College, Cambridge, where he received a B.A. in 1944 and an M.A. in 1947. In
between, he was in war service as Experimental Officer for the British Admi-
ralty 1943-46, and afterwards, he held an academic position at the University
of Reading starting in 1949. According to Kreisel [1958b, p.157], “I knew Witt-
genstein from 1942 to his death. We spent a lot of time together talking about
the foundations of mathematics, at a stage when I had read nothing on it other
than the usual Schundliteratur.” Indeed, they again had regular conversations
in 1942, when we can fairly surmise that the 18-year old Kreisel would have
been impressionable and receptive about the foundations of mathematics. For
1943-45, however, their generally separate whereabouts would have precluded
much engagement. During 1946-1947, after the war, they had regular discus-
sions on the philosophy of mathematics, although Wittgenstein had not written
very much on the subject for two years.3 At that time, Kreisel wrote his first
paper in mathematical logic, [Kreisel, 1950]. From 1948 on, they would only
have had intermittent contact, as Wittgenstein had resigned his professorship
in 1947 and Kreisel took up his academic position at Reading in 1949. By the
end of 1949, Kreisel had submitted for publication his [1951] and [1952a], the
first papers on his “unwinding” of proofs. Wittgenstein was diagnosed with
prostate cancer in 1949 and died in 1951. In what follows, we make what we
can of the “early” Kreisel of the 1942 and 1946-7 conversations, our perception
refracted through his published reminiscences.
Nearly half a century afterwards, Kreisel [1989a] provided “recollections and
thoughts” about his 1942 conversations with Wittgenstein.4 Early paragraphs
typify the tone (p.131):
I was eighteen when I got to know Wittgenstein in early 1942. Since my
school days I had had those interests in foundations that force themselves on
beginners when they read Euclid’s Elements (which was then still done at school
in England), or later when they are introduced to the differential calculus. I
spoke with my ‘supervisor’, the mathematician Besicovitch. He sent me to a
philosophy tutor in our College (Trinity), John Wisdom, at the time one of the
few disciples of Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein was just then giving a seminar on
the foundations of mathematics. I attended the meetings, but found the (often
described and, for my taste, bad) theatre rather comic.
Quite soon Wittgenstein invited me for walks and conversations. This was
not entirely odd, since in his (and my) eyes I had at least one advantage over
the other participants in the seminar: I did not study philosophy. Be that as it
may, in his company (a` deux) I had what in current jargon is called an especially
positive Lebensgefu¨hl.
Kreisel soon went on (p.133): “One day Wittgenstein suggested that we take
a look at Hardy’s [A Course of] Pure Mathematics together. This introduction
3See [Monk, 1990, p.499].
4What we quote from [Kreisel, 1989a] is taken from the English translation in
[Kreisel, 1990a, chap.9]. [Kreisel, 1978c] provides a shorter account of the 1942 engagements
with Wittgenstein.
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to differential and integral calculus was a classic at the time, and, at least in
England, very highly regarded.” Kreisel thence put the book in a mathematical
and historical context, mentioning that Wittgenstein “had only distaste” for
it—“something in the style, and perhaps also in the content, was liable to have
got in the way”—and opining that the “foundational ideal” in Hardy was passe´
and to be supplanted by Bourbaki. Kreisel then recalled (p.136):
In the first few conversations about Hardy’s book, Wittgenstein discussed
everything thoroughly and memorably. The conversations were brisk and re-
laxed; never more than two proofs per conversation, never more than half an
hour. Then one switched to another topic. After a few conversations the joint
readings came to an end, even more informally than they had begun. It was, by
then, clear that one could muddle through in the same manner.
As a matter of fact, Wittgenstein in his 1932-3 “Philosophy for Mathematicians”
course had already read out passages from Hardy’s book and worked through
many examples.5 What Kreisel writes coheres with Wittgenstein having made
annotations in 1942 to his copy of the eighth, 1941 edition of Hardy’s book.6
Just before these remarks, Kreisel had given a telling example from the
conversations (p.135): “If y = f(x) is (the equation of) a curve continuous in
the interval 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 and such that f(0) < 0 and f(1) > 0, then f intersects
the x-axis. The job was to compute, from the proof (in Hardy) a point of
intersection.” This of course is the Intermediate Value Theorem, the classical
example of a “pure existence” assertion. In a footnote, Kreisel elaborates: “The
proof runs as follows. If f( 12 ) = 0, let x0 =
1
2 . Otherwise, consider the interval
1
2 ≤ x ≤ 1 if f( 12 ) < 0, and the interval 0 ≤ x ≤ 12 if f( 12 ) > 0, and start again.
This so-called bisection procedure determines an x0 such that f(x0) = 0.”
7
Kreisel mentioned “constructive content” and how “. . . in the conversations
one looked for suitable additional data”. He elaborated elsewhere ([Kreisel, 1978c,
p.79]):
Wittgenstein wanted to regard this proof as a first step, and restrict it by
saying: the proof only gives an applicable method when the relevant decision
(whether f( 1
2
) is equal to, greater than, or less than 0) can be done effectively
(e.g. if f is a polynomial with algebraic coefficients).
I still find Wittgenstein’s suggestion (of a certain restriction) agreeable: sat-
isfaisant pour l’esprit. But it is certainly not useful (since the restriction is
hardly ever satisfied). A variant ([Kreisel, 1952b]) is much more useful: it ap-
plies when the restriction is only approximately satisfied, i.e. when one is able
to decide not necessarily at x = 1
2
itself, but sufficiently close to it (e.g. in the
case of recursive analytic functions on [0, 1]).
5cf. [Wittgenstein, 1979].
6See [Floyd and Mu¨hlho¨lzer, 2019] for accounts and interpretations of these annotations.
7This proof is a binary version of the original [Cauchy, 1821, note III] proof of the Interme-
diate Value Theorem, and there is a historical resonance here. Being a pure existence assertion,
the formulation and proof of the Intermediate Value Theorem by Cauchy and [Bolzano, 1817]
was a significant juncture in the development of mathematical analysis. Their arguments
would not be rigorous without a background theory of real numbers as later provided e.g. by
[Dedekind, 1872]. The glossy Dedekind-cut proof found in Hardy (§101) is embedded in that
theory, and Wittgenstein raised issues about the extensionalist point of view generally —
cf. [Floyd and Mu¨hlho¨lzer, 2019].
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Wittgenstein’s suggestion here—what Kreisel finds “agreeable”—is quite astute,
resonant with the Intermediate Value Theorem not being intuitionistically ad-
missible. There are continuous functions for which it is not intuitionistically
possible to decide for their values whether they are equal to, greater than, or
less than 0.
The forth-and-back in the quotation about Wittgenstein’s agreeable sugges-
tion and then its lack of usefulness is a local chiasmus of some significance.
Kreisel is best known today, of course, for pioneering the study of the construc-
tive content of proofs and the metamathematics of constructivity. In recollec-
tions ([Kreisel, 1989a, p.131]) “still exceptionally vivid, though perhaps rose-
colored”, he is emphasizing in self-presentation the constructive content. The
18-year old Kreisel may fairly be said to have been launched into his lifelong
work by these early conversations with Wittgenstein. Kreisel subsequently wrote
(p.136): “After the war I had a chance to go into mathematical logic in more
detail; in particular, into consistency [WF] proofs. Instead of pursuing Hilbert’s
aim of eliminating dubious doubts about the usual methods of mathematics a
more compelling application (better: interpretation) of those proofs occurred to
me. Once again, the issue was a kind of constructive content; not, however, for
items in some mathematical textbook, but for all derivations in some current
formal systems.” This was the direction of Kreisel’s initial, and incisive, work
in mathematical logic published in [Kreisel, 1950], of which more below.
On Wittgenstein’s side, through 1942 he was actually working as a hos-
pital dispensary porter in London toward the end of the Blitz, coming up to
Cambridge on alternate weekends to deliver lectures on the foundations of math-
ematics (and presumably meeting with Kreisel then).8 During this period, he
penned remarks that would be compiled into Parts IV-VII of the Remarks on the
Foundations of Mathematics.9 Part V of the Remarks has an extensive discus-
sion of non-constructive existence proofs and Dedekind cuts—Hardy’s approach
to the reals.
Kreisel (p.137) went on to write that Wittgenstein lent him a copy of The
Blue Book at the beginning of summer 1942 and that he returned it by its
end. The Blue Book was a text that Wittgenstein had dictated for his 1933-4
“Philosophy for Mathematicians” course and of which only a few copies were
maintained. In The Blue Book Wittgenstein first brought forth the textures
of meaning and language that would be elaborated in the Philosophical Inves-
tigations, like “language games” and their understanding through “training”
toward the beginning and what to make of “I am in pain” with respect to the
“I” at the end. Notably, in the face of this Kreisel only mentioned raising a
“malaise” with Wittgenstein about his notion of “family resemblances of con-
cepts”. Invested in mathematics, Kreisel gave as an example the concept of
group with its subcategories, mentioning a latter-day motto of his, “relatively
few distinctions for relatively broad domains of experience”. He could be said to
have sidestepped Wittgenstein’s main thrust, as exemplified by his example of
8cf. [Monk, 1990, chap.21,esp. p.443], [Wittgenstein, 1993].
9cf. [Monk, 1990, p.438]. The part numbers given for the Remarks are evidently for its
second edition [Wittgenstein, 1978].
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“game”, where various games have family resemblances but there is no property
joining all instances, and the generality may be open-ended and evolving.
At this point, we record a passage from the [Monk, 1990] biography, a part of
which has been passed along several times about Kreisel vis-a`-vis Wittgenstein:
In 1944—when Kreisel was still only twenty-one—Wittgenstein shocked Rhees
by declaring Kreisel to be the most able philosopher he had ever met who was
also a mathematician. ‘More able than Ramsey?’ Rhees asked. ‘Ramsey?!’
replied Wittgenstein. ‘Ramsey was a mathematician!’
Wittgenstein was steadily drawn to mathematicians for conversation and intel-
lectual stimulation. In the early 1940s, he would have found interaction with
Kreisel in the next generation newly stimulating.
The post-war, 1946-7 conversations may have been extensive and far-ranging,
but we can only make something of two published recollections of Kreisel. The
first is about style, from [Kreisel, 1978b, n.2]:
The matter of jargon, or style, came up often in my conversations with
W (from 1942 to his death in 1951). For example, once after W had invited
F.J. Dyson, who at the time [1946–] had rooms in College next to W’s, to discuss
foundations, Dyson had said he did not wish to ‘discuss’ anything because what
W had to say was not different from anything everybody was saying anyway,
but he wanted to hear how W put it. W spoke to me of the occasion, agreeing
very much with what Dyson had said, but finding Dyson’s jargon a bit ‘odd’.
On another occasion, W said: Science is O.K.; if only it weren’t so grey.
This resonates with what Kreisel wrote at the end of [1989a], that “The exposi-
tory style (of Wittgenstein’s conversations, where ‘expository’ would not apply
to discussions) was at any rate for me much more successful”, and “Wittgen-
stein’s favorite quotation: Le style, c’est l’homme”. Beginning with Wittgen-
stein’s “distaste” for the style of Hardy’s book, one can venture that the young
Kreisel imbibed a sensibility to “style” so construed, this later seeping into his
mathematical approach and writing.
The other recollection involves consistency proofs and the unprovability of
consistency. As mentioned above, from [Kreisel, 1989a, p.136] one has “After
the war I had a chance to go into mathematical logic in more detail; in particular,
into consistency proofs”, and at that time he had done the work to be published
in [Kreisel, 1950]. From that publication, we can gather that he had began by
assimilating the 1939 Grundlagen der Mathematik II of Hilbert and Bernays.10
Kreisel wrote in [1983a, pp.300f] about what would have been from 1946-7:
A few days after receiving several short, reasonable explanations of Go¨del’s
incompleteness proofs Wittgenstein opined full of enthusiasm that Go¨del must
be an exceptionally original mathematician, since he deduced arithmetical theo-
rems from such banal—meaning: metamathematical—properties like WF [con-
sistency]. In Wittgenstein’s opinion Go¨del had discovered an absolutely new
method of proof.
10Kreisel elsewhere in [1987, p.395] wrote of “consistency proofs (which I had learnt in
1942 from Hilbert-Bernays Vol. 2)”. This may have been, especially in the sense of first




What he meant was that the metamathematical interpretation (made pos-
sible by the arithmetization of metamathematical concepts) makes the relevant
arithmetical theorems immediately evident. This can be compared to the geo-
metric interpretation of algebraic formulas, such as ax2 + ay2 + bx+ cy+ d = 0,
from which it becomes obvious that two such equations cannot have more than
two common roots (x, y), since two circles can intersect in at most two points.
There is ample evidence that Wittgenstein had already become aware of
some of the ins and outs of Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem a decade earlier
in 1937, when Turing’s work came out.11 What Kreisel is drawing attention
to is Wittgenstein’s apprehension of a “new method of proof”, the metamathe-
matical interpretation making the relevant arithmetical theorems “immediately
evident”.
Kreisel is known to have lectured on “Mathematical Logic” at the Moral
Sciences Club on 27 February 1947, with Wittgenstein chairing.12 The subject
was presumably on the work to be published in [Kreisel, 1950].
Kreisel in that [1950] deftly provided “constructive content” to the Go¨del
incompleteness theorem, first exhibiting the sensitivity to recursiveness that
would be a hallmark of his subsequent work. Drawing out recursive aspects
of the Hilbert-Bernays 1939 Grundlagen der Mathematik II proof of Go¨del’s
second incompleteness theorem, Kreisel established, in modern terms, that the
Skolemized form of Go¨del-Bernays set theory has no recursive model, exhibiting
as a corollary a formula of first-order logic which has a model but no recursive
model. Discussing at the end the definability of predicates through diagonaliza-
tion, Kreisel provided the following telling, footnote 4:
A great deal has been written since Poincare´ on diagonal definitions occur-
ring in a system of definitions. A very neat way of putting the point is due to
Prof. Wittgenstein:
Suppose we have a sequence of rules for writing down rows of 0 and 1,
suppose the pth rule, the diagonal definition, say: write 0 at the nth place (of
the pth row) if and only if the nth rule tells you to write 1 (at the nth place of
the nth row); and write 1 if and only if the nth rule tells you to write 0. Then,
for the pth place, the pth rule says: write nothing!
Similarly, suppose the qth rule says: write at the nth place what the nth
rule tells you to write at the nth place of the nth row. Then for the qth place,
the qth rules says: write what you write!
Kreisel is acknowledging the rule-following versions of the Go¨delian contrary, as
well as the Turing direct, diagonalization arguments as given by Wittgenstein
in conversation. As Kreisel moved forward with his “unwinding” [1951, 1952a]
for constructive content of known proofs, this marks a closure point for the
formative time of his direct engagement with Wittgenstein. Significantly, Kreisel
will return to this footnote in the fullness of time and with a altered perspective,
as will be discussed in §3.
11cf. [Floyd, 2001]. Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics [1956], Part I, drawn from
1937 manuscripts, has Wittgenstein ruminating over Go¨del’s proof of the the incompleteness
theorem.
12cf. [Wittgenstein, 1993, p.355].
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On Wittgenstein’s side, he with a change of aspect wrote in 1947 about
Turing and rules ([Wittgenstein, 1980, §1096]):
Turing’s ‘machines’. These machines are humans who calculate. And one
might express what he says also in the form of games. And the interesting games
would be such as brought one via certain rules to nonsensical instructions. I am
thinking of games like the “racing game”. One has received the order “Go on
the same way” when this makes no sense, say because one has got into a circle.
For that order makes sense only in certain positions. (Watson.)
A variant of Cantor’s diagonal proof:
Let N = F (k, n) be the form of the law for the development of decimal
fractions. N is the nth decimal place of the kth development. The diagonal law
then is N = F (n, n) = Def F ′(n). To prove that F ′(n) cannot be one of the
rules F (k, n).
Assume it is the 100th. Then the formation rule of F ′(1) runs F (1, 1), of
F ′(2) F (2, 2) etc. But the rule for the formation of the 100th place of F ′(n) will
run F (100, 100); that is, it tells us only that the hundredth place is supposed to
be equal to itself, and so for n = 100 it is not a rule.
[I have namely always had the feeling that the Cantor proof did two things,
while appearing to do only one.]
The rule of the game runs “Do the same as . . .”—and in the special case
it becomes “Do the same as you are doing”.
This intensional, “rule” version of Turing’s undecidability argument showing
that the diagonal rule cannot be among the listed rules13 corroborates Kreisel’s
footnote.
2 Middle Kreisel
In 1953, Wittgenstein’s literary executors Elizabeth Anscombe and Rush Rhees
published Philosophical Investigations [1953], what would become Wittgenstein’s
main legacy, out of manuscripts intended for publication. In 1956, the executors
and G.H. von Wright published Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics
[1956], out of sporadic, working manuscripts from 1937-1944. And in 1958, Rush
Rhees published The Blue and Brown Books [1958], two crafted texts from 1933-
1935 sparsely circulated but never intended for publication. Kreisel, well into
his career publishing five papers a year in mathematical logic and having met
Go¨del in Princeton, took it upon himself to provide extensive reviews of both
the 1956 and 1958 publications. Let us proceed to this “middle” Kreisel with
respect to Wittgenstein. Beyond our focus on Kreisel, it is of interest to take
account of these reviews as part of the initial reception of Wittgenstein’s works,
especially in light of the considerable scholarship now attendant to this corpus.
Kreisel in his review [1958b] of the Remarks on the Foundations of Mathe-
matics (RFM) took the compilation as presenting Wittgenstein’s philosophy of
mathematics, and contributed to setting a negative tone for its interpretation
for quite some time. It is to be remembered, first of all, that RFM consists of
unpolished, ruminating remarks never intended for publication and exhibit an
13[Floyd, 2012] calls this “Wittgenstein’s diagonal argument” and analyzes it in great detail
with respect to Turing’s 1936 paper.
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evolution of thought and focus. Something of this as well as residual positivities
for Kreisel were conveyed by him at the end of his review in a “Personal Note”,
which reveals an anxiety of influence:
I knew Wittgenstein from 1942 to his death. We spent a lot of time together
talking about the foundations of mathematics, at a stage when I had read nothing
on it other than the usual Schundliteratur. I realise now from this book that
the topics raised were far from the center of his interest though he never let me
suspect it.
What remains to me of the agreeable illusions produced by the discussions
of this period is, perhaps, this: every significant piece of mathematics has a solid
mathematical core (p.142, 16), and if we look honestly we shall see it. That is
why Hilbert-Bernays vol. II, and particularly Herbrand’s theorem satisfied me:
it separates out the combinatorial (quantifier-free) part of a proof (in predicate
logic) which is specific to the particular case, from the ‘logical’ steps at the end.
Certain interpretations of arithmetic and analysis have a similar appeal for me.
I realise that there are other points of view, but for the branches of mathe-
matics just mentioned, I still see the mathematical core in the combinatorial or
constructive aspect of the proof.
I did not enjoy reading the present book. Of course I do not know what I
should have thought of it fifteen years ago; now it seems to be a surprisingly
insignificant product of a sparkling mind.
Whether Kreisel was personally miffed or not, Wittgenstein scholarship has
shown that Wittgenstein often did not discuss directly with students and others
at the time what was at “the center of his interest”. The “agreeable illusions”
is chiasmatic, as Kreisel by this time had incisively pursued “the combinatorial
(quantifier free) part of a proof” in [1951, 1952a] and moreover had shifted the
focus of consistency proofs onto such parts in [1958a].
As to the concluding “insignificant product of a sparkling mind”, this would
become quoted, but evidently the “product” is the literary executors’, concocted
out of varying working manuscripts.
Kreisel begins his review by discussing Wittgenstein’s “general philosophy”
as a sophisticated empiricism sensitive to the ways of language. Kreisel considers
Wittgenstein’s starting point to be (p.138): “he is not prepared to use the
notions of mathematical object and mathematical truth as tools in philosophy.”
But Kreisel does not consider as convincing Wittgenstein’s arguments against
them, and (p.137) “his reduction to rules of language”. For Kreisel, “the real
objection to these notions is that, at any rate as far as I know, there does
not exist a single significant development in philosophy based on them.” With
this pragmatic pronouncement, he simply skirts the depths of Wittgenstein’s
grapplings in RFM with the objectivity of rule-following. Kreisel’s only allusion
to this is in a footnote (p.138):
. . . it should be noted that Wittgenstein argues against a notion of mathematical
object (presumably: substance), . . . but, at least in places . . . not against the
objectivity of mathematics, through his recognition of formal facts.
Having ferreted this out of Wittgenstein, Kreisel himself would later become
known for the dictum, “the objectivity of mathematics over the existence of
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mathematical objects”.14
Kreisel next gets to Wittgenstein on proof. While a large part of RFM is
devoted to aspects of proof, Kreisel here focuses on proof as related to theorem
and, later in the review, on the equivalence of proofs (see below). Kreisel takes
up as two themes that “A theorem is a rule of language and the proof tells
us how to use the rule”, and “The meaning of a theorem is determined only
after the proof”.15 Kreisel discusses the various ways Wittgenstein approaches
these themes at some length, but then deliberately reverses proof and theorem
(p.140):
Quite generally, it is simply not true that proof is primary and theorem derived,
that only the proof determines the content of a theorem. In fact, Wittgenstein
is wrong in saying that generally we change our way of looking at a theorem
during the proof (p.122, 30), but equally often we change our way of looking at
the proof as a result of restating the theorem; . . .
Kreisel will maintain this in his thinking as a chiasmus, elaborated with exam-
ples, but one can see it as a sort of surface reversal which can be subsumed into
the greater depths of Wittgenstein’s thinking.
First and foremost, Wittgenstein in RFM is seeing mathematics as a multi-
farious edifice of procedures and conceptual constructions, one for which proofs
and methods of deduction as embedded in practice are crucial. Kreisel, in flat-
tening the situation to a dichotomy between proof and theorem, and then shift-
ing the weight back to theorem, eschews the complexity of interplay and more-
over actually reinforces the importance of argument and construction. While
Wittgenstein emphasizes how a proof accrues to the meaning of a theorem both
by newly delineating its interplay of concepts and by providing procedural means
for its further application, Kreisel emphasizes that (p.141) “a theorem becomes
an assertion about the actual structure of its own proof”—which while focusing
on theorem is in line with Wittgenstein’s thinking. Kreisel’s other way of shift-
ing from proof to theorem is to emphasize that a proof yields new theorems,
e.g. about structures.16 Again, this is in accord with Wittgenstein’s thinking,
according to which a proof as procedure and becoming method is autonomous
and would prove perforce various theorems.
Second, Kreisel continues from the above displayed passage with (p.140):
e.g. if we are accustomed to the principle of proof that the totality of all subsets
of a set is itself a set, we may reject it when it is pointed out to us that it is
14For example, [Putnam, 1975, p.70]: “The question of realism, as Kreisel long ago put
it, is the question of the objectivity of mathematics and not the question of the existence of
mathematical objects.”
15Kreisel (p.136) refers to RFM II §39 for the first and RFM II §31 and III §30 for the
second.
16 Even much later, [Kreisel, 1983a, p.297] supports this versus Wittgenstein though with
an oddly drawn example: “A caveman conjectures that a2 − b2 = (a + b)(a − b) is valid for
all even integers. Of course he is right. But the proof shows that the theorem has nothing to
do with the distinctions of even and odd, integer or fraction. Therefore one formulates (the
more general theorem for arbitrary commutative rings. This notion is determined by those
few properties of the even integers which enter in the proof of a2 = b2 = (a + b)(a− b). The
more general theorem is more appropriate to the proof; in short: it is more meaningful.”
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only valid for the notion of a combinatorial set and not, e.g. for the notion of a
set as a rule of construction.
Pursuant of this—or with it as an anticipation—Kreisel in a later, critical part of
the review, on “Higher Mathematics”, writes (p.153): “Wittgenstein says (p.58,
6) that it was the diagonal argument which gave sense to the assertion that
the set of all sequences (of natural numbers) is not enumerable.” After describ-
ing the diagonal argument and posing it as a “definition” of non-enumerability,
Kreisel then wrote (p.153): “What is wrong here? Well, after all there was a
paradox, Skolem’s paradox, which puzzled people. The mistake is to think that
the diagonal argument applies only to the set of all sequences . . . ” Kreisel’s allu-
sion to Skolem’s paradox, in purported line with the above displayed quote, is a
local chiasmus in itself—about proof, theorem, and now the set of all sequences.
Contrary to what Kreisel said about the diagonal argument being applicable in
only one situation, Wittgenstein on the cited page had ruminated about “the
diagonal procedure” in its various aspects, and wrote, rather, that “it gives
sense to the mathematical proposition that the number so-and-so is different
from all those of the system”. A few pages earlier (pp.55f), he had discussed
the diagonal procedure as a method, e.g. of transcending the algebraic numbers,
and had expressed skepticism about the “idea” that the real numbers are not
enumerable. Kreisel’s simple gloss is seen to be overshadowed by Wittgenstein’s
wide-ranging remarks on the diagonal procedure as proof.17
The rest, and most, of the review concerns the “philosophy of mathematics”.
Kreisel had taken as Wittgenstein’s conclusion in “general philosophy” (p.137):
He regarded the traditional aims of philosophy, in particular of crude empiri-
cism, as unattainable. He objected to a mathematical foundation of mathematics
because the concepts used in the foundation are not sufficiently different from
the [mathematical] concepts described (p. 171, 13) and, he thought (p. 177)
that there are no mathematical solutions to his problems. He said the aim of a
philosophy of mathematics should consist in a clarification of its grammar . . .
For Kreisel, (p.143) “I do not accept his conclusions since I do no think that
they are fruitful for further research.” Again a pragmatic pronouncement, and
after rejecting on these grounds Wittgenstein’s main thrust, the “clarification
of its grammar” as a matter of mathematical activity, Kreisel proceeds, over
several pages, to counter Wittgenstein’s negativity about foundations with the
fruitfulness of contemporary investigations of set theory and of constructivity.
On the latter, Kreisel is discerning about the differences between intuitionism
and finitism, and here he does take Wittgenstein as making contributions to
finitist investigations.
Having cast light from his direction on foundations, Kreisel in the concluding
pages of the review returns to proof—the focus of Wittgenstein’s “foundational”
17Notably, Kreisel in his next review [1960], to be discussed below, went to the extent of
providing a “Correction” to the present review, allowing that Wittgenstein’s (p.251) “remarks
can be given a little more sense if an intensional notion of function (rule of calculation) is
considered”, and then giving three viable meanings of “enumeration”. This resonates with
how Wittgenstein was exploring the use of the diagonal argument and [Kreisel, 1950, n.4] as
discussed at the end of §1; we will return to this at the end of §3, about a mea culpa.
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concerns—as newly to be considered in the wider context. While Kreisel had
earlier chiasmatically shifted the weight to the range of theorems that a proof
can prove, he gets here to the range of proofs and Wittgenstein’s interest in char-
acterizing the equivalence of proofs and how they might be compared. Kreisel
writes that Wittgenstein (p.151) “does attempt to find a characterization of
a very general sort by basing a comparison of proofs on the application, or,
as he puts it (p. 155, 46) on what I can do with it.” Though he finds limi-
tations to this, Kreisel in support raises non-constructive existence proofs and
“what we can do” with them—which is allusive to his own researches along
these lines and their inspiration in his early conversations with Wittgenstein.
Wittgenstein in RFM had ruminated over Go¨del’s proof of the incompleteness
theorem, mainly about its ostensible play with truth, provability, and consis-
tency. Taking his arguments as “wild”, Kreisel strikes a positive path through
Go¨del’s arithmetization-of-syntax argument, delineating that (p.154) “all that
one needs of the concept of truth is R or ¬R.” Wittgenstein, generally, raised
issues around consistency as a formal concept, with respect to proofs and con-
tradictions. Kreisel insisted on the fruitfulness, writing (p.156): “proofs of con-
sistency and, more generally, of independence yield, perhaps, a better control
over a calculus than anything else.”
In his review [1958b] of RFM, aside from taking up objectivity vs. objects
Kreisel mainly addressed what he regarded as challenges posed by the text con-
cerning proof and foundations of mathematics as per meaning and knowledge.
Variously flattening aspects, he set out contrasting viewpoints of proof vs. the-
orem, of the fruitfulness of foundational investigations, and even of specifics of
the diagonal argument, the incompleteness theorem, and consistency. In this,
he elaborated and promoted constructive aspects of proof.
Kreisel’s review [1960] of The Blue and Brown Books can be seen as com-
plementary, in that the text deals more centrally with language, and so what
should be addressed is set in the seas of language rather than the precisification
of mathematics. It will be remembered (cf. §1) that Wittgenstein lent Kreisel
a copy of The Blue Book in the summer of 1942. The books first advance the
method that would serve to buttress the mature Philosophical Investigations.
In brief, Wittgenstein heralds the notion of a “language game” to shed light on
the foundations of logic: the method utilizes simplified snapshots of portions of
human language use to clarify meaning, understanding, and thinking. For con-
cepts and categories, there is an exploration of the limits of reductive possibility,
to be seen in the plasticities of language. For Kreisel, (p.240) “. . . quite natural
developments of Wittgenstein’s considerations may be formulated as a reduction
to the concrete; for want of a better term I shall call it semi-behaviourism (with
respect to mental acts) or semi-nomimalism (with respect to abstract objects).”
This encapsulated interpretation is what Kreisel will discursively discuss in the
review, and at the end of the review is a telling summary (p.251):
As to content, the ideas of the book seem to be most relevant to the disci-
pline which studies what is concrete (and whose exact delineation is yet to be
evolved). On the positive side there are descriptions of little noticed phenomena
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(phenomenology) and reductions to concrete terms of many situations that are
in the first place viewed abstractly. As described above a wider sense of ‘reduc-
tion’ is appropriate than is used in crude positivism or nominalism. This work
shows convincingly a natural tendency of being unnecessarily abstract. On the
negative side, we have Wittgenstein’s theoretical positions; on analysis, there are
seen to be cogent consequences of philosophical doctrines, which, roughly speak-
ing, overestimate what can be done in concrete terms. Since the former seem to
be easily refuted they are used in reductio ad absurdum arguments applied to
the latter.
As an introduction to the significant problems [of] traditional philosophy
the books are deplorable.2
2This is largely based on a personal reaction. I believe that early contact
with Wittgenstein’s outlook has hindered rather than helped me to establish a
fruitful perspective on philosophy as a discipline in its own right, and not merely
for example as methodology of highly developed sciences. . . .
The last sentence and its footnote are darker still than what Kreisel had written
in that “Personal Note” at the end of the RFM review [1958b], quoted at the
beginning of this section.
In the body of the review, Kreisel rounds out his contentions about Wittgen-
stein’s “reduction to the concrete” with (p.240) “some illustrations taken from
the philosophy of mathematics.” At first, Kreisel is broadly affirmative about
how Wittgenstein describes (p.241) “often surprisingly successfully, situations
which are normally considered to involve just those mental acts and abstract
objects which he eliminates.” Kreisel relates this to how (p.242) “detailed in-
vestigations in the foundations of mathematics”—of which he writes tellingly in
a footnote “My own in this direction have certainly been influenced by the view
of Wittgenstein’s work here described”—“have revealed a similar situation with
respect to a nominalist (finitist, or, more generally, predicative) elimination of
such abstract objects as the totality of natural numbers or of functions.” Kreisel
points out how for a wide class of proofs Herbrand’s theorem provides “an elim-
ination in a quite precise and natural sense” and similarly, “in a large part of
analysis, quantification over all real numbers can be eliminated”. Concluding
about Wittgenstein’s “practice of philosophy”, (p.242) “Both his examples and
the studies in the foundations of mathematics show clearly that we have a gen-
eral tendency to describe language and, in particular, mathematical practice,
by means of concepts whose level of abstraction is higher than the minimum
actually needed.”
In the extended Remark following, Kreisel significantly pulls back by sug-
gesting that what he had earlier written (p.243) “may be too logically biased
and even altogether pragmatic.” Instead, “we may look at these books, par-
ticularly The Brown Book, as a contribution to the study of what is concrete,
of what is (immediately) given.” On this he brings in (p.243) “the theoretical
question of the existence of sense-data” and Wittgenstein’s “seeing X as Y ”.
With the latter, Kreisel is astute enough to bring out something that would be
central to Wittgenstein’s later thinking, though by calling them “phenomenolog-
ical studies” he diminishes their logical import. Kreisel pronounces (pp.243f):
“though even in his later book Philosophical Investigations these phenomeno-
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logical studies have not gone far enough to establish a discipline, the later work
is incomparably better in this respect than the books under review.”
Proceeding, Kreisel next considers Wittgenstein’s “theoretical positions”,
which he takes to be (p.244):
. . . (i) negative assertions on what cannot be said (or: is not), such as what is
common or essential to those cases which he describes as families of concepts,
(ii) assertions on what should be accepted as a decisive criterion (equality or
difference in) meaning, such as the actual use of a term, (iii) the identification
of metaphysical distinctions with grammatical ones.
Addressing (i), Kreisel takes Wittgenstein as objecting (p.244) “(a) gener-
ally, to the introduction of an (abstract) object common to all instances of a
general term, (b) to the assumption that a general term always corresponds
to a (single?—presumably: well-defined) property.” Addressing these, Kreisel
again resorts to mathematical illustrations. For (a), he points out that prop-
erties of rotations in the plane and multiplication of complex numbers can be
commonly derived from the group axioms, and while there is a distinction in
the two applications (p.245) “it’s a distinction without a difference” and “the
distinction is not vivid”. For (b), Kreisel alludes to “mechanical procedure” a`
la Turing, and notes that (p.246) “It seems very natural that one is not instan-
taneously convinced of correct characterisations even if the arguments are good
on reflection.” Finally, as to what is essential to a concept, Kreisel points to the
great deal of clarity gained “by the rather surprising discovery that relatively
few abstract structures were essential to the proofs in the greater part of current
mathematics.”
By remaining in the concrete and curtailed formulations of mathematics,
Kreisel is reducing away from Wittgenstein’s main thrust in The Blue Book
about the contexts and ostensible workings of language and meaning. Wittgen-
stein [1958, p.17], discussing “our craving for generality”, pointed out “We are
inclined to think that there must be something in common to all games, say, and
this common property is the justification for applying the general term ‘game’
to the various games; whereas games form a family the members of which have
family likenesses”, these overlapping in various ways. In a different direction
(p.18), of “the man who has learnt to understand a general term, say, the term
‘leaf’,” “We say that he sees what is in common to all these leaves; and this is
true if we mean what he can on being asked tell us certain features or properties
which they have in common. But we are inclined to think that the general idea
of a leaf is something like a visual image, but one which only contains what
is common to all leaves”, there being no such visual image. Finally, Wittgen-
stein somewhat anticipates the analytical and reductive approach that Kreisel
is taking, with (p.18):
Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes, and are ir-
resistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This
tendency is the real source of metaphysics, and leads the philosopher into com-
plete darkness. I want to say here that it can never be our job to reduce anything
to anything, or to explain anything. Philosophy really is ‘purely descriptive’.
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Addressing (ii) of the penultimate displayed quote, Kreisel continues to take
a reductive, scientific approach (p.247): “As far as actual use of words is con-
cerned,” it “may refer to the words spoken” or “it may also mean the real role
of the word (as Wittgenstein puts it) undistorted by the vagaries of linguistic
expression.” It will become increasingly understood that Wittgenstein gener-
ally meant, rather, the use in a broad sense in our ordinary language. More
attendant to the “real role”, Kreisel opines “. . . in the cases of the eliminations
of abstract terms . . . there seems no doubt about the actual use . . . “But in other
cases the whole problem is thrown back to what is conceived as the real role”—
on this referring to his discussion of “non-constructive” in the foundations of
mathematics in his RFM review.
Addressing (iii), Kreisel first recalls that in his RFM review, he (p.247) “also
questioned the value of the ‘reduction’ of metaphysics to grammar.” Here, he
refers to “syntactic” and “truth under the given interpretation” in mathematical
logic, and opines, “I see no evidence that the grammatical distinctions which
are to replace (problematic) metaphysical ones, are going to be described by
means of less problematic concepts.” This is a valid point, especially in answer
to the temptation to take schematic formalization as elucidation of the large
domains of truth and language. For Kreisel: “. . . the reference to grammar is
deceptive for two additional reasons: First, . . . one does not usually consider
such questions as ‘what is a noun’ in a theoretical way . . . . Second, while it
is apt to speak of a grammatical role of a word in a language, the difficulty of
formulating this seems to be of an entirely different order from school grammar
. . . ” Wittgenstein’s use of the term “grammar” may indeed be deceptive at
first, but it will become increasingly understood that he was taking it not as
some sort of syntactic classification, but rather a tying of meaning to rules, of
uses of general semantic types as these are correlated with syntactic categories
in utterance and use.
Stepping back, one can fairly get the feeling that Kreisel in his review did not
come to terms with Wittgenstein’s frontal engagement with language and mean-
ing. The Philosophical Investigations had come out in 1953, and the editor of
The Blue and Brown Books had subtitled it Preliminary Studies for the ‘Philo-
sophical Investigations’. Nonetheless, Kreisel insisted on pursuing a path akin to
the one taken in his RFM review, of making reductive logical pronouncements
and alluding to logical-mathematical examples—managing, along the way, to
make positive remarks about the elimination of abstract objects e.g. through
Herbrand’s theorem. In the large, Wittgenstein had begun to explore the seas of
language, its waves to and fro, when reduction does not work to get at meaning.
3 Later Kreisel
In the fullness of time, after having pursued and stimulated avenues of research
in constructive mathematics and proof theory and having had a substantive en-
gagement with Go¨del, Kreisel in several publications came again to engage with
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the words and ways of Wittgenstein. Latterly meditating on these in dialectical
interplay with his own work and experience, Kreisel exhibited in style and tone
a new, if commemorative, acknowledgement. This “later” Kreisel we pursue
through his publications in chronological order, now to the further purpose of
setting out his latter-day evolving thinking about logic and mathematics.
[Kreisel, 1976a], “Der unheilvolle Einbruch der Logik in die Mathematik”,
appeared among a collection of essays on Wittgenstein in honor of G.H. von
Wright. The title is from Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics IV 24,
“The disastrous invasion of logic into mathematics”. Kreisel takes this up as a
theme of RFM—this in itself evincing a new positivity about that work—and
proceeds to articulate his own thinking along these lines in light of contemporary
developments.
Kreisel at the beginning cogently summarizes his line of thought (p.166):
The aspects (of proofs and rules) which are regarded as basic in (1) current—
somewhat pretentious—logic, are not only different from those which are essen-
tial in (2) current mathematical practice (which almost goes without saying),
but actually harmful for a study of (2). The reason is that those basic questions
of ‘principle’, concerning the validity of principles of proof and definition, appear
more glamorous than the genuinely useful problems concerning current math-
ematical practice, and thereby divert attention from the latter. The ‘practice’
referred to in (2) includes not only applications inside or outside mathematics,
but also facts of experience concerning mathematical reasoning: which (combi-
natorial) configurations and (abstract) ideas we handle easily.
Then setting out toward elaboration, Kreisel instinctively retrenches (p.168):
“. . . at least in my own case, the quotation has not been of direct, not even of
heuristic use. I have known it for nearly 20 years, and stressed its plausibility
in my—otherwise rather negative—review of RFM. The brutal fact is that the
quotation does not contain the remotest hint of how (the pretentious) logical
analysis is to be replaced, that is which concepts should be used in the analysis
of proofs in the place of the ‘basic’ concepts of proof theory and which ques-
tions should be asked in place of the ‘principal’ problems of proof theory . . . ”
But later, “. . . the value of Wittgenstein’s quotation (for me) can perhaps be
summarized as follows: It is incisive and memorable, and so makes the reader
familiar with a certain aim. If sometime later this aim is approximated, the
reader is likely to take a closer look instead of moving on, breathlessly, to the
next ‘interesting’ possibility.”
Focusing on proofs and rules, Kreisel begins with the stark (p.169): “Proof
theory is, in my opinion, a particularly crass example of that pretentious logic
which was mentioned in the summary of this article . . . The claims of proof the-
ory to have uncovered the true, in particular, formal nature of mathematical rea-
soning surpass in pretentiousness the claims of most traditional philosophers.”
This is a bit of chiasmus, a reversal toward Wittgenstein, in that Kreisel had
himself proceeded in collaborative work in proof theory during this period with
something of such “claims” as incentive.
Be that as it may, according to Kreisel, “Wittgenstein’s critique of proof
theory and its principal problems (for example in the Remarks) is wildly exag-
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gerated, and therefore quite unconvincing.” (p.170) “Worse still, Wittgenstein’s
own attempts to characterize what is essential in proofs aren’t much better (than
Hilbert’s).” First, he “stresses that proofs create—or at least use!—new con-
cepts.” Yet “the brutal fact remains that, somewhere or other, propositions
concerning these new concepts have to be proved too.” And second, he stressed
that “proofs must be graspable and memorable . . . and visualizable if we mean
literal seeing of some spatio-temporal configuration . . . ” “But all this is clearly
secondary, as long as there are (genuine) doubts about the principles of proof
that are used.”
On this last, Kreisel makes an autobiographical remark revealing something
of influence. He had a “long hesitation before studying the idea of simplicity or
‘graspability’ (U¨bersehrbarkeit) of proofs” (pp.173f):
I just wasn’t confident about finding a sensible measure in any direct way.
First, I tried my hand at analyzing simplicity of principles of proof . . . , by means
of socalled autonomous progressions. Granted that these attempts were pretty
faithful to the intended meaning, I soon came to this conviction: if the analyses
are (even only) approximately right then those intended principles are just of
little intrinsic interest . . . So instead I went back to more traditional questions
about proofs, in particular, infinite proofs in intelligently chosen languages with
infinitely long expressions, and, above all, intuitionistic logic. . . . What I over-
looked was the witless way in which proofs entered! No recondite properties of
proofs were involved, no relations between proofs or between proofs and other
objects, nothing except their ‘logical’ aspects which occurs to us without any
experience in mathematics at all! In short, nothing but the hackneyed business:
The proofs establishes its conclusion (in particular a logic-free conclusion in the
intuitionistic case).
Kreisel continued (p.174): “But, at last, I had become . . . convinced that
questions of validity are by no means theoretically senseless . . . but that they
are unrewarding at the present time.” “At this stage it was natural to move so to
speak to an opposite extreme, in particular, opposite to Hilbert’s proof theory: I
went about looking for methods of proof and properties of proof which are trivial
for proof theory, but essential for mathematical practice . . . to be analyzed by
appropriate mathematical measures of complexity.”
On this, Kreisel gives two extended examples, the first being explicit defini-
tions (p.174):18
. . . we think of explicit definitions as introducing new concepts, the definition
being usually supplemented by a list of properties (of the new concept), which
are proved by the use of the explicit definition. As is well-known, this way
of introducing a new concept is trivial for Hilbert’s proof theory, because such
concepts are in an obvious way eliminable. On the other hand, for mathematical
practice they are not only useful, but as it were typical—at least for modern
mathematics, which is dominated by the axiomatic method. This proceeds as
follows. A structure is defined explicitly in set theoretic or number theoretic
terms, and then is shown to be, say, a unitary group: the axioms for unitary
groups then constitute the supplementary ‘list of properties’ (of the structure or
concept) mentioned above. The choice of such properties—or, as one says—of
the proper cadre—is often the key to solve mathematical problems.
18[Kreisel, 1977] elaborates along some lines, and in particular has a longer subsuming
account (pp.120ff) of explicit definitions.
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For Kreisel, his student Richard Statman in his 1974 dissertation made (p.175)
“impressive progress by means of a suitable measure of complexity which is
relevant in a large number of cases, in particular, for analyzing the role of
explicit definitions.”
The second example (p.177) “concerns a more subtle ‘invasion’ by logic,
namely a somewhat exaggerated idea of the role of socalled logical languages,
for example, of predicate logic of first order”, the exaggeration to be considered
concerning “the ideal form of a (mathematical) proposition”. On this, Kreisel
focuses on real closed fields. After mentioning Sturm’s work on determining the
number of zeros of a polynomial in an interval and noting that effective decisions
can be made when the coefficients are algebraic,19 Kreisel thence brought in, of
course, Tarski and the decidability of the first-order theory of real closed fields
as a generalization. On this though, Kreisel opined (p.178) “The trouble began
when people started to get interested in the efficiency of decision procedures
. . . ”, and “. . . assumed that the ‘ideal form’ of ‘the’ decision problem for real
closed ordered fields should deal with all formulas of the first-order language
(of fields). They found so-called upper and lower bounds, namely 22
cn
and 2cn
respectively, where n is the length of the formula.” (p.179) “. . . the most obvious
conclusion from the lower bounds is simply this: the full first-order language is
not appropriate! And one would look for a subclass of that language [that has]
a truly efficient procedure . . . ”. In the contemporaneous [1976b], Kreisel made
proposals along these lines, and in [1982] worked out details for an application
of Herbrand’s Theorem for Σ2 formulas.
After discussing related issues in budding computer science, Kreisel wraps
up with “questions of ‘principle’ ” and (p.186):
I find it hard to have confidence in our whole ‘critical’ philosophical tra-
dition, with it paradoxes, its dramatic claims either to see profound errors in
our ordinary views or profound misconceptions in 2000 year old questions. It
all sounds like a paranoid’s paradise, and forgets the most striking fact of intel-
lectual experience: how our thoughts seem to adapt themselves to the objects
concerned, as we study them and get familiar with them (in a detached way)
and how, with this familiarity comes the judgment need to distinguish between
plausible and implausible theories, substantial and superficial contributions.
After having elaborated in his own way about “the disastrous invasion of logic
into mathematics”, Kreisel here seems to come around to Wittgenstein’s ground-
ing faith in familiarity and the importance of our adaptability in coming to
judgment.
[Kreisel, 1978b], “Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics”, is ostensi-
bly a review of the compilation [Wittgenstein, 1976] of lectures notes for 1939
lectures put together by Cora Diamond. As if setting the stage, Kreisel quickly
sketched Wittgenstein’s progress ab initio, mentioning that (pp.98f) “W found
that quite elementary mathematics provided excellent illustrations of weaknesses
19Notably, this harkens back to that 1942 conversation with Wittgenstein (cf. §1) on
“constructive content” of the Intermediate Value Theorem and Kreisel’s effectivization in
[Kreisel, 1952a].
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of traditional foundations, t.f. for short”—this incidentally setting a contrastive,
positive tone from his RFM review.20 But then, Kreisel shifts the purpose
(p.99): “The main aim of this review is to restate the complaints of W and Bour-
baki about t.f., with due regard for the discoveries of mathematical logic . . . By
and large, at least in the reviewer’s view, the discoveries of logic support the
principal complaints.” With this Kreisel virtually ignores [Wittgenstein, 1976],
writing of it dismissively that (n.[2]) it “does not even record what W said in
the lectures, but what a bunch of students thought he had said”, and referring
to it only on one page (p.107).
Kreisel takes the principal target of W and Bourbaki to be (p.99) “the
formal-deductive presentation of mathematics in a universal system”. But while
“Bourbaki simply record their impression (of set-theoretic foundations)”, Kreisel
writes of Wittgenstein that (pp.99f) “. . . W attempts to convert fundamentalists
by ‘deflating’ the notions and thus the so-called fundamental problems of t.f.,
stated in terms of those notions. In W’s words, he wants to show the fly the
way out of the fly bottle. He does this with much ingenuity and patience, and
some overkill.”
Proceeding to “complaints”, Kreisel gets to (p.101): “. . . the general com-
plaint (of W and Bourbaki) is that t.f. may be poor philosophy, in the broader
popular sense of ‘philosophy’, specifically, if in practice the general aims of
foundations are better served by alternatives, for example, by ordinary care-
ful scientific research and exposition.” Taking as “principal complaint: better
current ideas than t.f.”, Kreisel discusses how both W and Bourbaki emphasize
that “the choice of explicit definitions is incomparably more significant than the
glamorous preoccupations of t.f., not only for discovery, a ‘mathematical’ affair,
but also for intelligibility, a principal factor in reliability.”21 Finally, Kreisel ad-
dresses (p.102) “specific complaints about some glamor issues of t.f.”. The first
is “the matter of contradictions as in the paradoxes, or their absence, consis-
tency, as in Hilbert’s program.” “W had a particularly strong aversion”, whereas
“at least by implication, Bourbaki was unimpressed”. The second example is
“higher (infinite) cardinals”. As in his RFM review, Kreisel connects this to
the diagonal construction, but now mentions favorably how Wittgenstein “pre-
ferred to use the construction in the context of rules”, recalling Wittgenstein’s
formulation as given in [Kreisel, 1950, n.4].22
Throughout Kreisel’s discussion of “complaints”, there is in contrast to his
RFM review a softer attitude toward Wittgenstein. This continues into Kreisel’s
acknowlegement (p.103) of “W’s advice”—what mainly he draws from the book
ostensibly under review—that “when confronted . . . by a philosophical problem
about (mathematical) notions or proofs, we should see what we do with them,
20cf. §1.
21[Kreisel, 1976a] elaborated on explicit definitions, as described in our account of it above.
Significantly, Kreisel there wrote (p.175): “As far as I know, Wittgenstein himself never
stressed the role of explicit definitions particularly.” Now, he is accrediting to Wittgenstein
how he stressed the choice of explicit definitions.
22cf. end of §1.
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how we use them.”23 Kreisel concludes his “review” by “balancing the account
on the positive side of t.f.” He opined that to Wittgenstein the weaknesses of
t.f. mattered less than the (pretentious) style, but proceeded to set out several
examples—two from Go¨del—for how such stylistic urgings may signal possibil-
ities for progress.
[Kreisel, 1978a], “The motto of ‘Philosophical Investigations’ and the philos-
ophy of proofs and rules,” ostensibly takes up that motto, “All progress looks
bigger than it is” interpreted as (p.13) “the ratio of actual progress (as judged
by mature reflection) to apparent progress (measured by expectations after a
few initial successes) is generally poor.” With this as underlying thrust, Kreisel
proceeds to elaborate on Wittgenstein’s “family resemblances of concepts” and
“principal pedagogic aim for philosophy”, and discusses, in an extended ap-
pendix, “proofs and rules” to draw in recent logical experience. With this,
Kreisel hovers closest to Wittgenstein’s major work, Philosophical Investiga-
tions.
Kreisel starts by laying some groundwork about (p.15) “General features
of traditional philosophy, and some of their implications”: (a) “. . . traditional
notions occur to us when we know very little.” “. . . when we know very little, we
tend to see superficial, abstract features of objects. And when we do see specific
features we often cannot say very well—cannot ‘define’ in familiar terms—what
we see.” (b) “When we know very little, the main intellectual tools available are
a sense of coherence and, more generally, introspection.” (c) “When we know
very little compared to the scope of a question, we are often bad at guessing
even remotely the methods needed for a satisfactory answer though often we
recognize such an answer immediately when we see one.” Kreisel peppers (b)
and (c) with historical examples involving Galileo, Plato, Aristotle, Newton,
and Cauchy.
Kreisel then focuses on (p.17) “Family resemblances of concepts”, and, in
connection, “the discovery of definitions”. It will be remembered24 that in 1942
Wittgenstein lent young Kreisel a copy of The Blue Book, and that, remark-
ably, Kreisel only reacted about family resemblances, and that with reference
to the group concept. Here too, of the many themes of Philosophical Investi-
gations, Kreisel concentrates on family resemblances, now with a remarkably
literal twist (p.19): “As I see it (now), Wittgenstein’s slogan of ‘family re-
semblances’ reminds one of a class of phenomena where the limitations of the
traditional style are exceptionally vivid, and hence instructive. I mean the phe-
nomena of literal family resemblances, say of the Hapsburgs or the Bourbons
[sic]. What can we realistically expect from any definition of such a family
resemblance, say, in the style of analytical philosophy?” This focus on literal
family resemblances amounts to a local chiasmus moving in reverse to Wittgen-
stein’s conceptualization of aspectual similarities and analogues. The tenor of
Philosophical Investigations is to pursue aspects and work against definitions
23This recalls Wittgenstein’s attempt to compare proofs according to“what we can do with
them” in RFM, as already discussed by Kreisel in his RFM review (cf. §1).
24cf. §1.
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of family resemblances in terms of biological causes or necessary and sufficient
conditions. Be that as it may, Kreisel proceeds to several points (p.19):
(a) “The first thing to expect is, probably, a genuine theory of literal family
resemblances or some kind of practical mastery. As appears almost certain now,
molecular biology is the appropriate tool here.” With this scientific coordination
of a question emerging “when we know very little”, and especially with Kreisel
soon following up with “We cannot expect to find a common element in ordinary
experience”, one can see Kreisel as proceeding orthogonally to Wittgenstein by
looking for a genetic reduction. (b) “A second use to expect from a definition
would be for the study of our actual process of recognizing a family resemblance.
At least here, Kreisel is sensing the importance of what Wittgenstein wrote of
as “seeing as” and “the dawning of an aspect”. (c) (p.21) “An imaginative
(clever) definition in this style, in terms of familiar things, may well be useful
for stimulating—not the actual process of recognition of family of resemblances,
but some of its useful results.” Again taking a scientific approach, Kreisel
mentions as an example of this kind of stimulation “logical validity in terms of
derivability, say by Frege’s rules”.
Lastly, Kreisel attends to what he terms (p.22) “intimate pedagogy”, what
he took to be (p.14) “Wittgenstein’s principal pedagogic aim for philosophy”.
Kreisel takes a particular tack (p.22): “Suppose we have come to the conclusion
that some given notion, for example, one of those grand traditional notions, has
to do with a family resemblance . . . . Of course, we do not assume that such a
conclusion, even if sound, can be conveyed convincingly, especially to individu-
als with very limited experience. We ask the pedagogic question: What can be
done?” Emphasizing the need for discretion—not to make “grand” claims—and
that “precise formalization” can be instructive, Kreisel proceeds to two exam-
ples, Tarski’s truth definitions and Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem. Of the
latter (p.24) “It unquestionably refutes the idea that, in mathematics, abstract
notions are merely used as a fac¸on de parler. Hilbert expressed this idea explic-
itly and precisely in his consistency programme. A more direct formulation of
the idea, which is equally easy to make precise, is that a proof by use of abstract
notions of a theorem stated in elementary form, can be straightforwardly con-
verted into an elementary proof.” Incidentally, Kreisel soon wrote revealingly
(p.25): “Digression for readers who have seen my (constipated and fumbling)
review in [[Kreisel, 1958b]] of Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics. To
me the single most disturbing (and most surprising) defect of those Remarks
was and remains Wittgenstein’s own fumbling.”
As in his other articles concerning Wittgenstein, Kreisel insists on taking a
scientific approach, and here, in an extended appendix, he further focuses on
logic and mathematics to draw subtle distinctions about proofs and rules that
round out his contentions. In particular, he has (p.27) “the novel twist of using
notions from Brouwer’s intuitionist foundations to examine a natural analogue
of Church’s thesis.” While having taken on the motto from the Philosophical
Investigations, Kreisel interestingly and chiasmatically proceeds away from its
broad concerns towards the nuances of progress in logic and mathematics.
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[Kreisel, 1983a], “Einige Erla¨uterungen zu Wittgensteins Kummer mit Hilbert
und Go¨del”, starts out “I was very astonished by the Remarks on the Founda-
tions of Mathematics when they came out, especially by those on Go¨del’s in-
completeness theorems, for reasons that I can state precisely only now . . . ” The
article, in a recapitulative way, engages Wittgenstein’s views on consistency and
incompleteness with a palatably seasoned appreciation.
Initially, Kreisel adopts and adapts Wittgenstein’s (p.296) “proofs easy to
take in and remember”. In RFM, Wittgenstein had importantly discussed how
mathematical proofs are to be “easy to take in and remember [u¨berschaubar und
einpra¨gsam]” and “perspicuous [u¨bersichtlich]”. Kreisel declares that “. . . one of
the main concerns of mathematics is to provide general guidelines for proofs to
be easy to take in and remember.” The guidelines are for what he analyzes into
two parts as follows: “For usually one starts from a long, opaque proof and dis-
sects it—with intuition—into a few lemmas, that is to say into a structure easy
to take in. In this process one tries to formulate (or, if necessary to reformulate)
the lemmas in such a way that the properties used in their proofs are easily as-
similated by the memory, so that they are easy to remember.” Kreisel frames
this with elements from [Kreisel, 1976a] (discussed above), especially the appeal
to properties that occur frequently and their axiomatic analysis for perspicuity.
He then sets out (p.297): “Now we are ready to apply some of Wittgenstein’s
favorite slogans to the axiomatic analysis of proofs, e.g. the relatively original:
the proof constructs (i.e., in the proof one discovers) new concepts, or the very
popular one around 1930: only the proof gives meaning to the theorem that
it proves.” (It will be remembered that Kreisel in his [1958b, pp.140f] review
of RFM had worked chiasmatically against these slogans.) Kreisel proceeds to
give “two (entirely elementary) examples”,25 these evidently in the spirit of the
elementary RFM examples.
Proceeding to Hilbert’s program and consistency, Kreisel declaims (p.298):
“Like many others around 1930, Wittgenstein was decidedly enthusiastic about
the main component of Hilbert’s program: formalization.” Yet on two points
Wittgenstein was critical: “Firstly, . . . he thought it not fruitful to consider all
calculations of a ‘calculus. Put differently: formal provability (even by limited
means) without regard to ease to take in and remember seemed to him a bad
idealization.” “Secondly, he was disturbed by Hilbert’s exaggerated claims for
the importance of consistency.” On this last, Kreisel puts Wittgenstein in com-
pany with Brouwer and Russell as also “very critical”, and mentions Go¨del and
Gentzen’s criticism that “consistency at best guarantees the validity of univer-
sal theorems . . . , whereas in practice one is rather more interested in existence
theorems.”
Considering next the shift from provability to proofs, Kreisel writes (p.300):
“Since completeness and incompleteness only relate to provability, and have
nothing to do with the structure of proofs, they lose their central role.” But
then, “What happens to incompleteness proofs when incompleteness itself loses
its ‘fundamental’ significance? A normal person remembers the good advice:
25The first was given in footnote 16.
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we have nothing to fear but fear itself. In other words, such proofs have more
meaningful consequences . . . .” On this Kreisel relates an anecdote from the
1940s, the last of his quoted in §1, with how, with the incompleteness proofs,
“In Wittgenstein’s opinion, Go¨del had discovered an absolutely new method of
proof.”
Kreisel ends with “Wittgenstein’s expectations” (pp.301f):
Above all the Remarks were meant to stimulate the reader to have his own
thoughts; especially those readers who had already come close to Wittgenstein’s
thoughts. . . .
This expectation was confirmed by my own experience. When they came
out, the Remarks did not help me at all. Since the end of the sixties I myself
had started to consider structural properties of proofs. After a lecture in 1973 in
which I presented these ideas and their development (also by Statman), Nagel
drew my attention to the fact that these tendencies (certainly not the details)
reminded him of Wittgenstein’s Remarks. I was absolutely unaware of this con-
nection before then. But I am entirely aware of the additional confidence in my
own thoughts that I derived afterwards from leafing through, e.g., Wittgenstein’s
Zettel. Added to this was a certain pleasure, at his skillful formulations and my
reformulations of his less skillful ones.
That said, Kreisel retrenches with softer versions of criticisms from his RFM
review: how Wittgenstein’s specific examples were not fruitful for Kreisel; how
he has no use for Wittgenstein’s “fussing with clarity and clarification”; and
Wittgenstein’s “often erroneous contraposition of clarification of existing knowl-
edge and new constructions”. Nonetheless, throughout [Kreisel, 1983a] there is
steady, serious engagement with Wittgensteinian incentives in RFM.
Kreisel’s last articles concerning Wittgenstein are variously elliptical, remi-
niscent, or outright expressionistic. [Kreisel, 1983b] is a quick review of Kripke’s
1982 book, Wittgenstein: On Rules and Private Language, a review that amounts
to a series of chiasmatic remarks putting things in a series of different nut-
shells. [Kreisel, 1989a] is a collection of “recollections and thoughts” about
conversations with Wittgenstein, from which we have already drawn in §1. And
[Kreisel, 1989b], Zu Wittgensteins Sensibilita¨t, written for a festschrift, is a re-
markably expressionistic series of wide-ranging aphorisms, quips, repartees, and
things that came to mind—but nevertheless an article that fully affirms Kreisel’s
deep engagement with Wittgenstein.
As a way of affirming and accentuating an overall chiasmus for Kreisel, his
eventual reversal in attitude about RFM after his negative review [Kreisel, 1958b],
we consider passages from a appendix to a long letter [1990b] that Kreisel wrote
to Grigori Mints in 1990. First, from p.24:
In a sense I might be said to have made fun of Wittgenstein in a review I
wrote in the 50s of his Remarks on the foundations of mathematics (although
this description certainly does not fit the way I felt about that volume nor about
the review). I had made a mistake, which I noticed some 20 years later,∗ and
have referred to it many times. But let me repeat it here, since you may not
have taken in these references.
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Main Mistake. I did not look at the preface, where the editors say in the
clearest possible terms that they had found a box full of notes by Wittgenstein,
and that they had selected what, to them, seemed most extraordinary. N.B. I
knew those editors! So, if I had looked at the preface this passage would have
been an immediate warning: what is most extraordinary (=remarkable) to them
was almost bound to be either wrong [?] or even an aberration.
With the ∗ he references [Kreisel, 1979], a brief review of the second edition
[Wittgenstein, 1978] of RFM that does not mention any mistake. In the preface
to RFM [Wittgenstein, 1956], the editors nowhere state that they “had found a
box full of notes”, but do state (p.viie) “. . . what is here published is a selection
from more extensive manuscripts”.
Later on, Kreisel wrote (pp.25f):
Consequences of the main mistake. Actually, in the last paragraph of the
review (in the 50s) I said explicitly that I simply did not recognize in the Remarks
on the foundations of mathematics what I had remembered minimally from my
conversations with Wittgenstein. Fittingly (at least from my view of the world),
I ignored what I remembered of Wittgenstein, and read the volume as a foil to
my then current interests, mentioned above: What, if anything, does it say that
is in conflict with—tacitly, the mere coherence of—the foundational tradition?
STAGGERING OVERSIGHT on my part. I myself had put on record
(in [[Kreisel, 1950]], somewhere in a highly visible footnote)—published during
Wittgenstein’s lifetime!—Wittgenstein’s perfectly good understanding of Go¨del’s
incompleteness theorem; tacitly, in the mid 40s, after I had explained it to him
in < 1
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hour in WORDS CONGENIAL TO HIM. In accordance with his habit
he recorded the explanation in his own words, incidentally stumbling thereby
on—what later came to be called—Henkin’s problem.
Henkin’s problem is [Henkin, 1952]: “If Σ is any formal system adequate for
recursive number theory, a formula (having a certain integer q as its Go¨del
number) can be constructed which expresses the proposition that the formula
with Go¨del number q is provable in Σ. Is this formula provable or independent of
Σ?” [Kreisel, 1953] discussed an approach to this problem, and then [Lo¨b, 1955]
established provability for more general formulas and under minimal conditions
on Σ, the result now known, of course, as Lo¨b’s Theorem.26
The overall chiasmus working its way through the previous and the current
sections is first, the critical attitude Kreisel took to the Remarks on the Foun-
dations of Mathematics in his review [Kreisel, 1958b] as particularly seen in his
negative remarks about Wittgenstein’s purported construals of the diagonal ar-
gument and the first incompleteness theorem, and second, a gradual working
back, as traced in this section, to a nuanced assessment and appreciation in his
articles in the 1970s and 1980s, particularly in [Kreisel, 1983a], ostensibly in
tandem with the evolution of his own thinking and experience. The letter ce-
ments the chiasmus further, working various angles of mistakes and oversights.
In particular, Kreisel not only records the mea culpa of his not recalling having
mentioned Wittgenstein’s rule-following version of the diagonal argument in first
26With Bew the provability predicate and pϕq the Go¨del number of ϕ, Lo¨b’s Theorem
asserts that for adequate Σ, if Σ ` Bew(pϕq) −→ ϕ, then Σ ` ϕ. Henkin had asked whether
Σ ` ϕ or not in the special, fixed-point case when is ϕ.
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logic paper [Kreisel, 1950],27 but credits Wittgenstein for actually formulating
Henkin’s problem, a problem he himself later worked on.
Stepping back and taking it all in from the beginning, one sees the “early”
Kreisel as stirred to his lifelong engagement with constructivity and proof by
conversations with Wittgenstein, particularly with the “combinatorial core” of
consistency proofs. One sees the “middle” Kreisel with an anxiety of influence
reacting negatively in his reviews of Wittgenstein publications, flattening his
work on language and insisting on the fruitfulness of research into constructiv-
ity and even set theory. Finally, one sees the “later” Kreisel in published essays
interestingly integrating his latter-day, seasoned outlook on logic and mathe-
matics with remembrances of the words and ways of Wittgenstein. Proceeding
in dialectical engagement, Kreisel growingly acknowledges Wittgenstein as at
least providing a conceptual context. But while aspiring to encompass Wittgen-
stein’s broad ways of thinking about language, Kreisel would ultimately remain
within the compass of logic and mathematics as set out by RFM. There, the
engagement was enlivened by an appreciation of mathematical practice as the
place to look for the important structural properties of proof; the role of explicit
definitions in that regard; and the importance of proofs “easy to take in and
remember”. This rounds an arrow of influence, those early conversations with
Wittgenstein having stimulated Kreisel to constructivity, logic, and proof.
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